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The Due-on-Sale and Due-on-Encumbrance
Clause in Maryland
by Steve Lee
Almost every mortgage which is
issued today by a private individual
or by an institutional lender contains
either a due-on-sale or due-on-encumbrance clause, or both. A dueon-sale clause is triggered whenever
the property is sold or conveyed. A
due-on-encumbrance clause is triggered whenever the property is further encumbered, e.g., a second
mortgage. See Annot., 69 A.L.R. 3d
713 (1976). A typical due-on-sale
clause would read as follows:
If all or any part of the Property
or an interest therein is sold or
transferred by Borrower without Lender's prior written consent, Lender may, at Lender's
option declare all the sums secured by this Deed of Trust to
be immediately due and payable.
This type of clause is intended to
allow the lender to accelerate the
remaining balance due under the
mortgage upon the transfer of any
interest in the property. The historical basis of such a clause was to
protect the lender's security. In recent times, however, the clause has
been used to increase the interest
rate on outstanding mortgages in
order to improve loan portfolios.
This practice has focused a great deal
of national attention and provoked a
considerable amount of controversy.
When used by lenders solely to increase interest rates, the courts try
to determine whether the clauses are
enforceable or whether the clauses
impose an unreasonable restraint on
alienation or violate some other public policy.
In Wellenkamp v. Bank of America,
21 Cal. 3d 943, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379,
582 P.2d 970 (1981), the court held
that federal law did not expressly or
impliedly pre-empt state law in this
area; consequently the court limited

the lender's right to utilize a dueon-sale clause to cases where the
lender could demonstrate that the
transfer of the property had impaired its security. Responding to
the Wellenkamp decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court held in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. De
la Cuesta, -U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 3014
(1982), that the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board's due-on-sale regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-3(f), (g)
(1982), pre-empts conflicting state
limitations on the due-on-sale practices of federally-chartered institutions. Specifically, 12 C.F.R.
§ 545.8-3(f) states:
An association continues to have
the power to include ... a provision in its loan instrument
whereby the association may, at
its option, declare immediately
due and payable sums secured
by the association's security instrument if all or any part of the
real property securing the loan
is sold or transferred by the
borrower without the association's prior written consent.
The rule is further explained in 12
C.F.R. § 54 5 .8- 3 (g):
Limitations on the exercise of dueon-sale clauses. [A] Federal association: (1)Shall not exercise a
due-on-sale clause because of (i)
creation of a lien or other encumbrance subordinate to the
association's security instrument; (ii) creation of a purchase
money security interest for
household appliances; (iii)
transfer by devise, descent, or
operation of law on the death of
a joint tenant; or (iv) granting of
a leasehold interest of three years
or less not containing an option
to purchase; (2) shall not impose
a prepayment charge . . .; and
(3) waives its option to exercise
a due-on sale clause as to a

specific transfer if, before the
transfer, the association ...
agrees in writing that the person's credit is satisfactory to the
association and that interest on
sums secured by the association's security interest will be
payable at a rate the association
shall request ...
This regulation is applicable only to
federally-chartered institutions. It has
no binding effect on mortgages from
state-chartered institutions or private lenders. Consequently, it is important for both lenders and borrowers to know the effect of a due-onsale or due-on-encumbrance clause
in their state.
The exact number of existing mortgages issued by state-chartered institutions and private lenders is not
known, but it is thought to be a
number greater than those issued by
federally-chartered institutions. This
may be inferred in Maryland because
of the greater number of state-chartered institutions. As of June 30,
1982, in Maryland, there were fortyeight federally-chartered savings and
loan institutions compared to one
hundred and thirteen state-chartered savings and loan institutions,
and twenty-seven federally-chartered banks compared to seventy
state-chartered banks. The due-onsale issue is, therefore, still relevant
standing the De la Cuesta decision.
The remainder of this article will
pertain to the law as it exists in
Maryland for both types of due-on
clauses.
Maryland, unlike other states, has
little authority regarding the dueon-sale clause. The only Maryland
case to actually address the due-onsale issue is Chapman v. Ford, 246
Md. 42, 227 A.2d 26 (1967). Other
Maryland authority consists of two
related Attorney General "letters of
advice." 5 Nat'l Prop. L. Dig. 189
(April 28, 1980) (November 21, 1980)
[hereinafter the April 1980 Letter];
6 Nat'l Prop. L. Dig. 67 (November
21, 1980) [hereinafter the November
1980 Letter].
The letters from the Attorney
General, Stephen Sachs, were in re-

FORUM

sponse to a problem raised by the
Director of the Building, Savings and
Loan Division of the Department of
Licensing and Regulation. The issue
presented to the Attorney General
for consideration dealt primarily with
the enforceability of a due-on-encumbrance clause in Maryland, and
Attorney General Sachs limited his
advice to the fact pattern which
raised the issue.
The letters were not intended to
address the proper use of either type
of due-on clause by either a federally-chartered institution or a private lender, or the problem of applying the clauses to nonresidential
property. The situation which precipitated the need for the Attorney
General's letters centered around a
state-chartered savings and loan association's attempts to enforce the
due-on-encumbrance clause contained in their outstanding mortgages. The mortgagor in that case
had obtained a second mortgage on
the property without receiving the
required prior permission from the
mortgagee, the savings and loan.
Historically, lenders have sought to
enforce such a clause when the
mortgagor's action impaired their
security interests in the property,
but in this case it appeared the lender
sought only to improve its loan
portfolio by relending the money at
a higher interest rate. Attorney
General Sachs concluded:
[S]uch action would be against
public policy, either because such
exercise of a due-on-encumbrance clause would constitute an
unreasonable restraint on alienation, [La Sala v. American Savings and Loan Association, 5 Cal.
3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal.
Rptr. 849 (1971); Pas v. Hill, 87
Cal. App. 3d 521, 151 Cal. Rptr.
98 (1978)], or because it might
constitute an unconscionable use
of a contract clause in violation
of traditional notions of equity,
[Baltimore Life Insurance Co. v.
Harn, 15 Ariz. App. 78, 486 P.2d
190 (1971); Tucker v. Pulaski Federal Savings and Loan Assn., 252
Ark. 849, 481 S.W. 2d 725 (1971);

Clark v. Lachenmeier, 237 So. 2d
583 (Fla. App. 1970)].
November 1980 Letter, p. 68.
Attorney General Sachs agreed
with decisions in other jurisdictions
stating that due-on-clauses "are restraints on alienation, and therefore, subject to judicial scrutiny regarding the reasonableness of their
exercise." November 1980 Letter, p.
71. He also indicated that a lender's
attempt to accelerate a residential
mortgage under a due-on-encumbrance clause solely for the purposes of bettering a loan portfolio
would constitute an unreasonable,
and therefore, an unlawful restraint
on alienation.
In contrast, however, he thought
the Maryland courts would be less
likely to prevent the enforcement of
a due-on-sale clause than of a dueon-encumbrance clause. In an outright sale the seller usually receives
enough money to pay off the existing
mortgage loan which terminates the
seller's interest in the property. The
lender, on the other hand, must have
the ability to determine the creditworthiness of the assumptor in order to protect the security of its loan.
Under these circumstances, the restraint on alienation would not be
unreasonable and therefore the dueon-sale clause would be enforceable.
Chapman v. Ford, 246 Md. 42, 227
A.2d 26 (1967) somewhat supports
this rationale.
The pivotal issue in Chapman was
determining when the "sale" took
place for prepayment penalty purposes. The court concluded that a
legal and binding sale of the property
took place two weeks prior to a
formalized written contract. The court
".... found that the delay in entering
into the written contract was only an
attempt by the Chapmans to evade
the penalty clause of their mortgage
agreement with the Fords." Chapman, 246 Md. at 42, 227 A.2d at 32.
Chapman, however, is more important for what it did not discuss than
for what it did discuss. The court
held the contract to be a contract at

arm's length between consenting
parties, and therefore, enforceable
on its terms. The court in Chapman
did not concern itself with whether
the due-on-sale clause was invalid
as an unreasonable restraint on alienation or against public policy; it
chose instead to interpret the terms
of the mortgage literally. Arguably,
however, the court may have been
intimating that an oral contract for
the sale of real property is sufficient
to trigger the prepayment penalty
and, also, the due-on-sale clause.
Attorney General Sachs distinguished the facts with which he was
concerned from the facts found in
Chapman. Chapman clearly involves a
sale of property and the effect of a
due-on-sale clause, whereas, Sachs
was addressing the issue of a lien
(second mortgage) and the effect of
a due-on-encumbrance clause. Thus,
Chapman is not analogous to Attorney General Sachs' factual situation.
Unfortunately, the law in Maryland as to the due-on-sale and dueon-encumbrance clause is unclear.
Attorney General Sachs' conclusion
is similar to the federal approach as
stated in 12 C.F.R. § 545, 8-3(f) and
(g). The Attorney General states:
[A] due-on-encumbrance clause
(although not necessarily a dueon-sale clause), when exercised
by an institutional lender to accelerate a residential mortgage,
would be an unlawful restraint
on alienation, against public
policy, and therefore, not enforceable in this State if the
lender exercises the clause solely
for the purpose of allowing the
lender to relend money at a
higher rate of interest and not
for the purpose of protecting the
lender's security in the loan.
November 1980 Letter, p. 72.
The Maryland Court of Appeals
in Chapman did not discuss the possibility that the due-on-sale clause
contained in the mortgage might
constitute an unreasonable restraint
on alienation or be unenforceable
for other reasons. Nevertheless, one

XIII/1

must question whether the case
might be decided differently today
or whether a slight change in the
facts might provide a different result. The case law in many states
dealing with this question has
changed over the last six years. See
Annot., 69 A.L.R. 3d 713 (1976).
Most states have followed the approach taken by the California
courts. This approach also seems to
be the one that Attorney General
Sachs would like the Maryland
courts to follow.
A recent Maryland case deserving
attention in light of the above discussion is Daugharthy v. Monritt Associates, 293 Md. 399, 444 A.2d 1030
(1982). Daugharthy deals with the
"wrap-around" mortgage, a mortgage which wraps around, or is in
addition to an existing mortgage. It
would be entirely speculative to draw
any conclusions from the Daugharthy case, but it does give some indication of how the Court of Appeals might view a due-on-sale or
due-on-encumbrance case today.
In Daugharthy,the court held that
a "wrap-around mortgage" was
"subject to" the existing mortgage
and not an assumption of that mortgage. The court's reasoning was
based on language which expressly
stated that it was taken "subject to"
the existing mortgage. The existing
mortgage included a clause stating:
The parties agree that the said
deferred purchase price shall be
assumable by a later purchaser,
should grantor herein sell the
property to a third party, provided however that the note
holders, or assignee or assignees, shall have the right to change
the rate of interest to a prevailing
rate of interest as of the time of
such assumption.
Daugharthy, 293 Md. at 401, 444 A.2d
at 1031.
This clause was intended to allow
the mortgagee to raise the interest
rate upon the sale of the property.
The court, however, refused to allow the mortgagee to either accel-

erate the balance due or increase the
interest rate, holding that Maryland
law regarding assumptions is clear.
Where there is an express contrary
agreement to take "subject to" rather
than assume liability, the existing
mortgage is not assumed, and neither the acceleration clause nor the
interest rate clause is triggered. See
Brice v. Griffin, 269 Md. 558, 307 A.2d
660 (1973).
The Daugharthycase can be interpreted as either a strict-construction
case or as a reluctance on the part of
the court to allow lenders to increase
mortgage interest rates upon the sale
of property. The latter view is more
likely. It does point out, however,
that in Maryland both lenders and
borrowers should be certain of the
language contained in any due-on
clause because a Maryland court will
probably interpret it literally and
strictly. If such a clause is required,
a borrower should have it written as
an assumable mortgage with an interest rate escalation clause upon
sale. One can then follow the Daugharthy case closely, hopefully, in order to pass the low-interest mortgage
on to the purchaser. A lender should
be sure to include a due-on-sale
clause similar to the example given
at the beginning of this article. In the
event of a sale or transfer of the
property, a higher or blended interest rate can be offered if the language
in the mortgage is clear and not open
to judicial interpretation.
Presently, Maryland lenders and
borrowers seem to be content to operate under the guidelines provided
by Maryland Attorney General
Sachs. Those guidelines basically
follow the federal approach. Therefore, a due-on-sale clause in a mortgage is probably enforceable by the
lender. A due-on-encumbrance
clause is probably enforceable by the
lender when it is exercised to protect the lender's security interest and
unenforceable when it is exercised
solely to improve its loan portfolio.
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